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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a 
corporation 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FRANK H. FULLMER, DAVID H. 
FULLMER and WILLARD L. 
FULLMER, JR., individually, and 
as co-partners doing business under 
the name and style of FULLMER 
BROS., a co-partnership; WILLIAM 
L. PEREIRA doing business as WIL-
LIAM L. PEREIRA & ASSOCI-
ATES ; WILLIAM L. PEREIRA & 
ASSOCIATES, a corporation; and 
ALLEN STEEL COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
ANSWER AND REPLY 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
All matters preliminary to the Argument have 
been adequately discussed in the opening briefs sub-
mitted herein. While Appellant Prudential (here-
inafter referred to as Appellant) takes issue with 
certain matters set forth by Respondent Pereira 
(hereinafter referred to as Respondent) in its State-
ment of Facts, for the sake of simplicity Appellant 
will discuss these matters in relation to the particu-
lar points of law to which these matters pertain. 
Case No. 
10258 
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APPELLANTS ANSWER TO RESPONDENT'S 
CROSS APPEAL 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER UTAH LAW, THE ACTIVITIES OF RESPON-
DENT CLEARLY CONSTITUTED DOING 
BUSINESS IN UTAH. 
A. JURISDICTIONAL FACTS 
The following" facts of record in this case are 
clearly sufficient to sustain the trial court's find-
ing that Respondent was at tall times material hereto 
doing business in the State of Utah: 
1) As the Architect Agreement between Ap-
pellant and Respondent discloses, Respondent under-
took and agreed to perform extensive architectural, 
engineering and supervision services in connection 
with the design and construction of the five-story 
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association 
Building in Salt Lake City. (Ex. A, R. 77 et seq.) 
Among other things, this Agreement required Re-
spondent's full-time supervision during the construc-
tion period, and Respondent expressly contracted to 
furnish the services of a qualified superintendent 
to reside in Salt Lake City during the entire con-
struction period. (Ex. A, R. 78, pam. 5(c) ) . 
2) The building project in the instant case 
was commenced early in the year 1962 (Complaint, 
R. 16, para. I l l ) , at which time Respondent sent 
Mr. James S. Manning to Salt Lake City to per-
form the supervisory services above mentioned. 
2 
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(Pereira affidavit, R. 123, para. 9; Manning affi-
davit, R. 31, para. 6). 
3) Mr. Manning opened an office in Salt Lake 
City, and the name "Wm. L. Pereira & Associates" 
wias listed on the first floor directory of the build-
ing. (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 104, para. 2). 
4) Mr. Manning engaged a secretary and in-
structed her to answer the phone "William L. Pere-
ira & Associates." Moreover, Mr. Manning obtained 
a listing in the Salt Lake City telephone directory, 
in both the regular and yellow classified sections, 
for William L. Pereira & Associates, listing a Salt 
Lake City address. Significantly, this listing also 
appears in the most recent Salt Lake City Direc-
tory, published in June, 1964. (Kershisnik affidavit, 
R. 104, para. 2). 
5) Respondent on its letterhead stationery 
designated Mr. Manning as "Resident Architect, 
125 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah." 
(Kershisnik affidavit, R. 104, para. 2). 
6) In 1964, Mr. Manning opened a checking 
account in the Beehive State Bank in Salt Lake 
City in the name of William L. Pereira & Associ-
ates. (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 104, para. 2). 
7) During the period from 1962 through 
1964, Respondent engaged in extensive business 
operations other than Appellant's project, including 
design and supervision of a building for Brigham 
Young University lat Provo, Utah, involving gross 
construction costs of approximately six million dol-
3 
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lars ($6,000,000). (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 104, 
para. 3 ; Donovan affidavit, R. 100, para. 11). 
8) Respondent directed Mr. Manning to 
"drum up" additional architectural business for Re-
spondent in Salt Lake City, and Mr. Manning in 
fact actively solicited such business throughout the 
period from 1962 to 1964. (Kershisnik affidavit 
R. 104-105, para. 3). 
9) Respondent prepared certain schematic 
and preliminary plans and drawings in connection 
with a proposed residence in Salt Lake City for Mr. 
Gene Donovan, Appellant's President, for which 
services Respondent was paid fees in the approxi-
mate amount of $1,300.00. (Pereira affidavit, R. 
122, para. 4). 
10) William L. Pereira has individually held 
a license to practice architecture in the State of 
Utah since 1954. (Staten affidavit, R. 116, para. 
11). 
11) Respondent performed full time architec-
tural services in Salt Lake City with respect to Ap-
pellant's project as late as June 11, 1964. (Manning 
affidavit, R. 149, paras. 4-5). 
12) Respondent on July 21, 1964, submitted 
its statement showing fees which it claimed were 
owing from Appellant on its project in the total 
amount of $255,573.15 as of that date. (R. 163). 
B. APPLICABLE LAW 
Respondent argues that under Utah law, archi-
tectural services performed over a period of two 
4 
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years and involving the construction of two multi-
million dollar buildings in Utah constituted mere 
"isolated transactions," not constituting a continu-
ing activity with in the State. (Respondent's Brief 
pp. 15-16). First of all, it is significant that the 
Utah Legislature in defining the requirements 
whereby a foreign corporation must qualify to do 
business in the State, exempted such corporations 
from the registration requirements of Utah law, if 
only a few isolated transactions were involved and 
were completed within a thirty day period, (Section 
16-10-102 (j) UCA 1953 the Utah Business Corpor-
ation Act) Obviously, the Legislature never intend-
ed that continuous and extensive activities occurring 
over a two year period could be considered as "iso-
lated transactions." 
Moreover, the cases which Respondent cites in 
support of its position are clearly inapplicable. The 
case of Marchant, et al., v. National Reserve Com-
pany of America, et al, 103 Utah 530,137 P.2d 331, 
cited by Responderit at page 13 of its Brief held 
that where the sole corporate activity in Utah over 
a four year period was the execution of four deeds 
for the conveyance of land, the corporation could 
not be held to be doing business in Utah. The Conn 
v. Whitmore case, 9 U.2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959), 
cited at page 14 of Respondent's brief, involved the 
single sale of two horses and is obviously an isolated 
transaction. The East Coast Discount Corporation v. 
Reynolds case, 7 U.2d 362, 325 P.2d 853 concerned 
the question whether plaintiff should have quali-
fied to do business in Utah, to entitle it to bring 
5 
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suit in Utah courts; consequently, this case is not 
helpful in determining the proper limits of juris-
diction over non-resident defendant corporations. 
Finally, the Western Gas Appliances v. Servel, Inc. 
case, 123 Utah 229, 257 P.2d 950, cited by Respon-
dent at page 14 of its Brief is easily distinguishable, 
for it involved a foreign corporation which had no 
office, telephone, property or employee in Utah, and 
which neither solicited or miade any direct sales of 
goods in Utah, except to wholesale distributors. 
The following Utah cases fully support the 
lower court's finding herein. Industrial Comm. v. 
Kemmerer Coal Co., 106 Utah 476, 150 P.2d 373 
(1944) held that defendant nonresident corpora-
tion was doing business in Utah within the meaning 
of Section 104-5-11, Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
which section was identical to present Utah Rule 
4(e) (4). It based its finding upon facts strikingly 
similar to those involved in that instant case: 
"In the instant case the defend'ant maintains 
an office in this state at its own expense for 
the convenience of its resident agents who 
solicit business for it here and also that these 
agents may be in a position to furnish it re-
ports of any business opportunities which 
might become available here. Its name is list-
ed in the telephone directory, the building di-
rectory in v^hich it maintains this office and 
also on the door of the office. It makes a regu-
lar and continuous attempt to solicit sales of 
its coal to consumers in Utah through these 
employees." (150 P.2d at pp. 374-375). 
6 
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In McGriff v. Charles Antell, Inc. et al, 123 
Utah 166, 256 P.2d 703 (1953), Justice Henriod 
made the following important observation directly 
applicable to our situation: 
"To date the pattern, which in a changing 
world is ever changing, excludes solicitation 
alone as justifying jurisdiction conferred. Be-
yond such solicitation the activity to confer 
jurisdiction must be of sufficient substance 
and of such scope and variety as would leiad 
a court of last resort to conclude that immun-
ization of the foreign corporation against the 
power of our forum would be unrealistic, un-
reasonable and a vehicle for oppressing or 
meting out injustice to our own local citizens" 
(256 P.2d 'at p. 705, emphasis added). 
Similarly, in the instant case, it is at once 
apparent that immunization of a foreign corpora-
tion engaged in and responsible for the design and 
on-site supervision Of multi-million dollar public 
and private building projects within this State 
clearly would be unrealistic and unreasonable, for 
in Respondent's business, the potential risks of 
harm to persons and property in Utah is far greater 
than in the typical sales situation involved in the 
cases upon which Respondent so heavily relies. 
In Dykes v. Reliable Furniture & Carpet, 3 
U.2d 34, 277 P.2d 969 (1954), Justice Henriod re-
affirmed this Court's position that mere solicita-
tion of sales would be insufficient to constitute do-
ing business, and stated that the requisite "some-
thing else" in addition to solicitation should be: 
"such as would inspire in a reasonable per-
son's mind the conviction that such outsider, 
7 
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as a practical matter, is present in the state 
personally or by authorized representation, to 
further his business interests with local in-
habitants through real and identifiable con-
tracts representing a continuity of dealing 
and activity not too dissimilar from that in-
dulged by local business people attending to 
their own business pursuits. (277 P.2d at p. 
972). 
Appellant submits that from the facts set forth 
hereinabove, it is clear that Respondent held itself 
out to be, and in fact was for over two years present 
in this State by authorized representatives who con-
ducted its business; that Respondent's course of 
conduct and that of its local representatives was sub-
stantially similar in continuity and activity to the 
normal course of conduct generally pursued by every 
local architect; that the work being done was the 
result of specific and identifiable contracts for that 
work and requiring local representation; and that 
the present lawsuit arises directly out of these con-
tracts and that work. 
Finally, in Conn v. Whitmore, supra, Justice 
Crocket reviewed the line of United States Supreme 
Court cases commencing with International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 
L. Ed. 95 (1945), which case established the rule 
that due process requires only that the non-resident 
corporation have certain minimum contacts within 
the state, such that invoking jurisdiction against 
it does not offend traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice. Justice Crockett concluded 
that in order to subject a corporation to the juris-
8 
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diction of the courts of a foreign state the following 
test shall be applied: 
"There must be some substantial activity 
which correlates with a purpose to engage in 
a course of business or some continuity of 
activity in the state so that deeming the de-
fendant to be present therein is founded upon 
a realistic basis and is not a mere fiction." 
(342 P .2da tp . 874). 
Appellant submits that the substantial activi-
ties of Respondent over the two year period involved 
herein clearly justify this Court in sustaining the 
lower court's finding that Respondent's presence in 
Utah is founded upon a realistic basis and not upon 
a mere fiction. 
Respondent, at pages 5 and 16 of its Brief, 
suggests the novel proposition that a foreign corpor-
ation should not be considered as doing business in 
this State if it performs such business in Utah at 
the request of the other party. Respondent cites no 
authority to support this proposition, and indeed 
no such authority exists. Clearly, the reason why 
Respondent was doing business in Utah is utterly 
immaterial to the instant question. At any rate, Re-
spondent's statement that its resident architect was 
stationed in Utah at Appellant's request is false, for 
the record shows that the Architect's Agreement 
itself required Respondent to provide a resident 
architect in Salt Lake City during the construction 
period. (Ex. A, R. 78, pam. 5 (c)) . 
Respondent, at page 18 of its Brief, argues that 
"at the time of all services of summons in question 
9 
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in this case, Pereira's representative was no longer 
stationed in Salt Lake City, nor was there any neces-
sity for his presence here." Thus, Respondent con-
tends that service of process was invalid for the 
reason that Respondent had previously withdrawn 
from the State. The fact remains that Mr. Manning 
was in the State doing business for Respondent when 
he was served. Respondent's assertion that its rep-
resentative was no longer needed in Salt Lake City 
simply is contrary to the facts. (See Point II (B), 
infra). In any event the question is moot since there 
is no merit in Respondent's legal contention. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit in Houston Fearless Corporation v. Teter, 318 
F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1963), recently rejected this 
argument, fas follows: 
"In further support of its position that it was 
not 'doing business' in Colorado, appellant 
points out that its corporate officer, upon 
whom service was made, was only in the state 
for a single day and that, after the termina-
tion of the agreement with Teter, it did not 
maintain an office, employee or representa-
tive in the state. This is true but it is hardly 
controlling here. 'A foreign corporation which 
has ceased to do business in a state is still 
subject to service of process in suits on causes 
of action which arose out of business carried 
on by the defendant in the state. '" (318 F. 
2d at 827). 
The view expressed by the opinion cited is also 
expressed in the following cases and authorities: 
In 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, Sec. 179, p. 697, footnote 98; Electrical 
10 
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Equipment Co. v. David Hamm Drayage Co., 217 
F.2d 656 (C.A. 8th 1954). 
See also Westcott-Alexander Inc. vs. Dailey, 
264 F.2d 853, (C.A. 4th 1959) and Ives v. Kinney 
Corporation, 149 F. Supp. 710 (Ga. 1957) and 20 
C.J.S., Corporations, Sec. 1920, p. 170, footnote 39, 
and the extensive cases cited thereunder and in the 
pocket supplement. 
Respondent in Paragraph 3, page 18 of its 
Brief claims there is no support anywhere in the 
record for the lower court's finding in paragraph 2 
of its Amended Judgment (R. 156) that "James S. 
Manning^ departure from Salt Lake City, Utah on 
or about June 11, 1964 was motivated in part by a 
desire on the part of the corporate defendant archi-
tect not to be served in the prospective Prudential 
lawsuit.'' Respondent then cites Mr. Manning's affi-
davit as containing the reasons why Mr. Manning 
left the State on June 11, 1964. On this point, Ap-
pellant brings to the attention of this Court the fact 
that Respondent knew prior to June 11, 1964 it was 
going to be sued (Donovan affidavit, R. 97; Staten 
affidavit, R. 116), and Mr. Manning immediately 
after he was served with summons in his Hotel 
Utah room on June 25, 1964 told Mr. Kershisnik, 
"that they knew this was going to happen and that 
Continental Casualty Company had told them 
months ago to get out of the State of Utah and stay 
out." Also, "He further stated that they neverthe-
less felt an obligation to perform the services for 
Prudential in 'accordance with their contract and 
11 
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bad informed Continental that they were going to 
do this regardless of the consequences, and that they 
had continued to maintain their offices in Salt Lake 
City until such time as the pressure had become so 
great that Manning had to leave." (Kershisnik affi-
davit, R. 108). 
APPELLANTS REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S 
BRIEF 
POINT II 
SERVICE UPON JAMES S. MANNING WAS PRO-
PEE AND SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
A. MR. MANNING WAS A REPRESENTATIVE OF 
RESPONDENT UPON WHOM SUMMONS WOULD 
PROPERLY BE SERVED. 
At page 6 of its Brief, Respondent contends 
that Mr. Manning was not within the class of per-
sons qualified to receive service under Utah Rule 
4 (e) (4). The pertinent portion of this Rule pro-
vides that service upon a corporation shall be under-
taken as follows: 
"If no such officer or agent can be found in 
the state, and the defendant has, or advertises 
or holds itself out as having, an office or place 
of business in this state, or does business in 
this state, then upon the person doing such 
business or in charge of such office or place 
of business." 
The case of W. L. Beard v. White, Green and 
Addison Associates, Inc., 8 U.2d 423, 336 P.2d 125 
(1959) interpreted this rule as follows: 
"Under that rule the person served must be 
more than a mere employee. He must be in 
12 
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charge of some of its property, operations, 
business activities, office, place of business 
or in some manner be responsible for or have 
control over its affairs." (336 P.2d at p. 126, 
emphasis added). 
See also the following cases, holding that serv-
ice is proper where the person served is held out to 
be, or is Ian agent of the corporation in some degree 
responsible for or in control of its affairs: Bristol v. 
Brent, 38 Utah 58, 110 Pac. 356, 358-359 (1910); 
Wein v. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 195 P.2d 222, 228 
(1948); Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Standard Accident 
Insurance Co., 191 F. Supp. 174,176 (D. Utah 
1960). 
The record herein fully supports service upon 
Mr. Manning in accordance with the principles of the 
above cases. Respondent informed Appellant and 
designated Mr. Manning as the person in complete 
charge of the project, and las the person to whom any-
one associated with the project was to turn for final 
answers as far as Respondent's activities were con-
cerned. (Donovan affidavit, R. 97, para. 3; Ker-
shisnik affidavit, R. 104, para. 1; Peterson affi-
davit, R. 137, para. 3). Respondent both on its 
letterhead stationery and in the classified pages of 
the Salt Lake City telephone directory designated 
and held out Mr. Manning as its "Resident Archi-
tect" in Salt Lake City. (Kershisnik 'affidavit, R. 
104, para. 2) These facts are undisputed. Conse-
quently, it is clear that Mr. Manning was represent-
ed as being, and in fact was an agent having requi-
site responsibility and control under the above Utah 
authorities. 
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B. MR. MANNING WAS NOT ENTICED INTO UTAH 
FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF SERVING HIM 
WITH PROCESS. 
Respondent has not attempted to analyze the 
numerous authorities set forth at pages 14-28 of 
Appellant's Opening Brief, nor does Respondent 
offer any contrary authority. Respondent relies 
solely upon cases involving settlement situations and 
consequently inapplicable to the situation under con-
sideration as discussed at pages 28-32 of Appellant's 
Opening Brief. 
Respondent has misstated the facts relating to 
the enticement issue in two material respects. First, 
at pages 7 land 22 of its Brief, Respondent states 
that by June 11, the construction period of the 
contract was over and Mr. Manning's supervision 
was no longer required. As pointed out in Appel-
lant's Opening Brief, pages 8 and 23 - 26, there 
remained unperformed by Respondent numerous and 
vital items of work required to be performed by 
Respondent under its Agreement with Appellant. 
In addition to Appellant's discussion of this issue 
in its Opening Brief, the following facts of record 
fully discredit Respondent's conclusions and unsup-
ported statements. 
Mr. Manning himself admits that the project 
was not completed when he left Salt Lake City on 
June 11, 1964, since the following items remained 
to be accomplished by Respondent: 
"A. Administrative details and verification 
of accounts. 
14 
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B. Verification of completion of punch-list 
items. 
C. The issuance of the Architect's completion 
certificate." 
(Manning affidavit, R. 149, para. 5) 
The record also contains an elaborate descrip-
tion of the nature of these unperformed items of 
work. Mr. Charles Peterson, construction superin-
tendent for the general contractor, Fullmer Bro-
thers, stated that the following work remained to be 
performed by Respondent as of June 11, 1964: 
1. Preparation of "punch-lists" to guide and 
correlate the final activities of the various 
trades, crafts and subcontractors working 
on the project, in order to allow completion 
of the building in a systematic fashion with-
out delay. 
2. Preparation of the final "punch-list." 
3. Approval of subcontractors' and suppliers' 
bills and invoices. 
4. Issuance of certain necessary change ord-
ers. 
5. On-site supervision of numerous items of 
work requiring Respondent's action or de-
cision, including problems with respect to 
the mechanical system, air conditioning, 
window washing equipment, window glass 
and floor coverings. (Peterson affidavit, R. 
138-142; see also references to affidavits 
at page 8 of Appellant's Opening Brief). 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Clearly, in view of these facts, Appellant was 
justified in insisting that Mr. Manning return to 
Salt Lake City to complete Respondent's work be-
fore the grand opening of the building scheduled 
for June 29. Verification of final accounts and pre-
paration of final punch lists could not have been 
prepared in the absence of an authorized supervis-
ory representative of Respondent making an on-site 
inspection to determine if the work had been per-
formed. As a matter of record, there were bills un-
paid in excess of $300,000 for work perform-
ed prior to June 11 (R. 160, 162) to be investigated 
and approved by Respondent as required by its 
Agreement (R. 79, para. 5 ( j ) ) . 
On pages 9 and 22 of its Brief, Respondent con-
tends that on June 25, 1964, when Mr. Manning 
returned to Salt Lake City, there existed no cri-
tical situation requiring his presence. As pointed 
out in Appellant's Opening Brief, pages 23-26, the 
opposite was true. Appellant had scheduled its grand 
opening for June 29. As early as June 11, the work 
had proceeded to the point where Respondent's on-
site supervision was essential in order to determine 
what work had been completed, what work had to 
be done, what work was defective and had to be 
remedied, what payments were due or were to be-
come due, what claims should be allowed or rejected, 
and what back charges should be made against the 
contractor and subcontractors. These essential mat-
ters had to be resolved before Respondent could cer-
tify final payment and issue its completion certi-
ficate. These matters could only be resolved by a 
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physical inspection of the work in Salt Lake City 
to determine what work had been done, how it had 
been done, by Whom it had been done and whether 
it was fully completed. Apart from the contractual 
relations this was manifestly necessary so that the 
required certificates of occupancy from Salt Lake 
City authorities could be obtained in time for the 
scheduled grand opening on June 29. (Kershisnik 
affidavit, R. 105-106, para. 5; Staten affidavit, R. 
113-114, para. 4; Peterson affidavit, R. 140-141, 
para. 9-10.) 
That Mr. Manning's return to Salt Lake 
City on June 24 was for the purpose of accomplish-
ing these necessary items of work is apparent from 
the record. On the morning of June 25, When Mr. 
Kershisnik entered Mr. Manning's hotel room, he 
observed a stack of correspondence approximately 
four inches thick pertaining to the job, consisting 
of invoices and correspondence dating back to the 
first part of June, which had not been processed. 
(Kershisnik affidavit, R. 108, para. 12). 
POINT III 
SERVICE UPON THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS 
PROPER AND SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
In its response to the extensive analysis and 
compelling authorities set forth by Appellant in its 
Opening Brief with respect to this point, Respon-
dent relies solely upon highly technical and uncon-
vincing arguments which cannot be determinative 
of this matter. First, on pages 28-29 of its Brief, 
Respondent relies upon cases relating to estoppel 
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in its traditional sense as a defense based upon mis-
representation, reliance and injury. Obviously, the 
numerous cases cited by Appellant in its Brief do 
not use the term in such a restricted sense. More-
over, many of Appellant's cases base their decision 
upon the alternative ground that by reason of de-
fendant's doing business in the State without com-
plying with state qualification statutes, defendant 
has impliedly consented to service upon the Secre-
tary of State of the State of Utah. (E.g., Clay v. 
Kent Oil Co., 38 N.W.2d 258, 259-260 (S.D. 1949) ; 
Wein v. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 195 P.2d 222, 231 
(1948), discussed fat pages 38-40 of Appellant's 
Opening Brief.) Respondent fails to discuss this 
alternative ground for sustaining such service. 
On pages 32-33 of its Brief, Respondent con-
t2nds that since the record shows that Respondent 
never qualified to do business in Utah, this Court 
cannot make a contrary presumption. Respondent's 
sole authority for this argument is the case of 
Lubrano v. Imperial Council, O.U.F., 37 Atl. 345 
(1897). First of all, Respondent overlooks the case 
of Flinn v. Western Mut. Life Ass'n., 171 N.W. 711 
(Iowa 1919), discussed at pages 35-36 of Appel-
lant's Opening Brief, wherein the court stated that 
since state law required defendant corporation to 
qualify to do business and appoint the state auditor 
as its agent, "it will be conclusively presumed as 
against the corporation that it did comply with such 
requirements, and its rights will be determined on 
the theory of such compliance." (171 N.W. at p. 
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713, emphasis added). Moreover, Respondent failed 
to quote the following language from the Lubrano 
case, supra, which immediately precedes the quoted 
portion set forth in Respondent's Brief: 
"It will thus be seen that in those cases where 
the defendant appeared and pleaded to the 
jurisdiction, by setting up the fact that it 
had not appointed some one authorized by it 
to laccept service of process, as required by 
statute, the courts uniformly held that this 
could not be allowed, the defendant being 
estopped from setting up its own misconduct." 
(37 Atl. at p. 247, emphasis added). 
Thus, the court in Lubrano noted that the prin-
ciple of estoppel is uniformly applied in cases such 
as that at bar where defendant actually appears 
and raises its failure to comply with state law in an 
attempt to avoid jurisdiction. In Lubrano, defend-
ant never appeared in the action to contest jurisdic-
tion. 
On pages 34-35 of its Brief, Respondent quotes 
certain language from the Model Business Corpor-
ation Act Annotated to the effect that section 108 
of the Act (from which Section 16-10-111 of the 
Utah Code was adopted) "leaves to other statutes 
or to the common law the question of service of 
process on foreign corporations which do not qualify 
to transact business in the State." (Vol. 2, p. 620, 
emphasis added). The principles of estoppel iand 
implied consent are such common law principles, 
and have been applied in a majority of cases to sta-
tutes such as Section 16-10-111. Thus, the com-
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mentary in the Model Act so heavily relied upon 
by Respondent fully supports Appellant's position. 
Finally, Respondent cites without discussion 
several cases noted in 18 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of 
Corporations, Sec. 8742. Appellant has already point-
ed out, on pages 34-35 of its Opening Brief, that 
While contrary authority exists, the weight of auth-
ority supports Appellant's position. (23 Am. Jur. 
Foreign Corporations Sec. 499, p. 513). Moreover, 
Fletcher recognizes that a "difference of opinion" 
exists concerning this question, and cites scores of 
cases applying the principles of estoppel and implied 
consent before mentioning the few cases rejecting 
these principles. (Fletcher, supra, pp. 622-626). 
None of the five cases cited by Respondent are con-
vincingly reasoned, and at least one such case, Roth-
rock v. Dwelling-House Insurance Co., 37 N.E. 206 
(Mass. 1894) is clearly distinguishable, since de-
fendant in that case never appeared in the action 
and had no notice of the suit until judgment was 
rendered against it. 
POINT IV 
SERVICE UPON GEORGE W. MOONEY WAS PROPER 
AND SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
A. MR. MOONEY WAS A REPRESENTATIVE OF 
RESPONDENT UPON WHOM SUMMONS COULD 
PROPERLY BE SERVED. 
At pages 11 and 38-39 of its Brief, Respondent 
contends that Mr. Mooney was not a proper person 
upon whom service is permitted under Utah Rule 
4...(e) (4). Appellant has discussed the requirements 
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of this Rule hereinabove, in connection with Point 
II (A). With respect to the facts, the record dis-
closes that Mr. Mooney was held out to Appellant 
to be, and purported to be the Construction Super-
intendent or Chief Superintendent of Respondent, 
and was so named in various progress reports pre-
pared by Respondent during construction of Appel-
lant's project. (Donovan ^affidavit, R. 100, para. 12). 
Respondent has never denied that such representa-
tions were made to Appellant, or denied that they 
were true. Moreover, Mr. Mooney was identified to 
Appellant as, and identified himself as being one 
of the superiors of James S. Manning, Respondent's 
resident representative in Salt Lake City. (Donovan 
affidavit, R. 100-101, para. 12). Again, Respondent 
does not deny these facts. Finally, Mr. Mooney fre-
quently reviewed the progress of the Appellant's 
project, consulted with Mr. Manning and with Ap-
pellant's officers concerning performance of the 
work and of Respondent's obligations thereunder, 
and performed similar duties for Respondent in 
Provo, Utah in connection with a project for Brig-
ham Young University. (Donovan affidavit, R. 101, 
para. 12). 
Mr. Mooney himself admitted that at the time 
he was served with process, he was in Salt Lake 
City to discuss with Appellant's representatives and 
others, certain problems with respect to the air con-
ditioning system in Appellant's building. (Mooney 
affidavit, R. 119, para. 6) Respondent's President, 
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William L. Pereira, admitted that Mr. Mooney was 
an employee of Respondent and that Mr. Mooney 
assisted Appellant in connection with construction 
of its building during the construction period. (Pere-
ira affidavit, R. 124, para. 12). 
Thus, it is clear that Mr. Mooney was doing 
business in the State of Utah on behalf of Respon-
dent, and was held out to be, purported to be, and 
was a person having sufficient responsibility and 
control for this Court to sustain service upon him 
under the authorities discussed hereinabove. 
B. THE FILING OF A MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE 
OF SUMMONS DOES NOT IMPAIR THE RIGHT 
TO SERVE ADDITIONAL SUMMONS UPON DE-
FENDANT. 
Respondent, at pages 39-42 of its Brief, argues 
that Appellant had no right to serve Mr. Mooney 
while a motion to quash service upon Mr. Manning 
was pending. Respondent relies solely upon the 
case of Farris v. Walter, stating that no contrary 
authority exists. Respondent does not discuss or 
even attempt to distinguish the case of Lane v. Ball, 
set forth at pages 43-45 of Appellant's Opening 
Brief. Moreover, Respondent's statements that the 
Farris case is "squarely in point", and "has been 
cited many times" are erroneous and misleading. 
Appellant has already discussed and distinguished 
the Farris case, at pages 46-47 of its Opening Brief. 
After a thorough examination of Shephard's Pacific 
Citator, Appellant has found not one case citing the 
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Farris decision on the point at issue. Obviously, 
Respondent would have cited in its Brief any author-
ity supporting Farris if such existed. 
Respondent contends that to allow additional 
service of summons While a motion to quash the ori-
ginal summons is pending would require the court 
to perform "useless adjudications." In fact, the 
converse is true, as pointed out in Appellant's Open-
ing Brief: Service of a second summons not con-
taining the alleged defect of the first summons 
would render moot the pending motion to quash, and 
would justify its dismissal. Respondent misconceives 
the principle of mootness, for it raises a situation 
wherein the court would be "at work determining 
questions made moot by plaintiff's unilateral ac-
tion" in serving additional summons. Clearly, since 
such questions are made moot by additional sum-
mons, they will not be determined by the court, but 
will be dismissed. (27 C.J.S., Dismissal and Non-
suit, Sec. 55, p. 401, and cases cited). 
CONCLUSION 
We submit to this Honorable Court that Re-
spondent has failed to assert cogent and convinc-
ing authority or analysis in support of any of the 
questions at issue herein. On the basis of the author-
ities cited herein, and in Appellant's Opening Brief, 
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we respectfully ask this Court to reinstate the serv-
ice of process upon Respondent William L. Pereira 
& Associates. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANKLIN RITER 
822 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
EARL P. STATEN 
604 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
THELEN, MARRIN, JOHNSON & 
BRIDGES 
111 Sutter Street 
San Francisco, California 
Of Counsel 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of 
March ,1965, copies of the foregoing Answer 
and Reply Brief of Plaintiff and Appellant were 
served upon Shirley P. Jones, Jr., Attorney for De-
fendant and Respondent William L. Pereira & Asso-
ciates, a corporation, 411 American Oil Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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